Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

Ronald Rex Ivie v. State of Utah, The utah
Department of health, Sen John William Hickman,
Rep, Stephen II Urquhart : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David J. Holdworth; Attorney for Appellant.
M. Gay Taylor; Robert H. Rees; Office of Legislatve Research And General Counsel; Attorneys for
Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Ronald Rex Ivie v. State of Utah, The utah Department of health, Sen John William Hickman, Rep, Stephen II Urquhart,
No. 20040071 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4774

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RONALD REX IVIE,

\PPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellant,

SI Al K OF UTAH, THE UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SEN
JOHN WILLIAM HICKMAN, REP.
STEPHEN IT URQUHART,
Defendants/Appellees.

:
: Appellate Case No. 20040071CA

ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
(Trial Court Civil No. 030400804)
Honorable Denise P. Lindberg/Michael K. Burton/Royal I. Hansen
Oral Argument Requested
David J. Holdsworth
9125 South Monroe Plaza Way, Suite C
Sandy, UT 84070
(801)352-7701
Attorney for Plaintiff/A ppi Hint
M. (Jay Taylor, Esq
Robert H. Rees, Esq.
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel
436 State Capitol
Salt Lake City UT 84114-1202
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUN 1 6 20W

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RONALD REX IVIE,

M'lM I I AIN I 'MM'I ININ(, I t m i ' l

Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FT ATI. THE UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SEN.
JOHN WILLIAM HICKMAN, REP.
STEPHENI! 'iKorHAK 1
Defendants/Appellee

Appellate Case No. 20040071CA

J'I'F \ L FROM i HE THIRD DISTRIC ' o« u .
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
(Trial Court Civil No. 030400804)
Honorable Denise P. Lindberg/Michael K. Burton/Royal I. Hansen
Oral Argument Requested
David '• i lM>i-uorlh
9125 South Monroe Plaza Way, Suite C
Sandy, UT 84070
(801)352-7701
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
M. Gay Taylor, ^~~
Robert H. Rees, Esq.
Office of Legislative Reseaitli ;ind < ieneral ('onnsel
436 State Capitol
Salt Lake City UT 84114-1202
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

BRIEF STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
NATURE OF THE CASE
B.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
C.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

3
3
3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

7

4

ARGUMENT
8
POINT I. THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS WERE CAPABLE OF A
READING WHICH PLACES CERTAIN ACTS OF THE
LEGISLATIVE DEFENDANTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF SPEECH
OR DEBATE CLAUSE IMMUNITY/LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY . 8
A.
Speech or Debate Clause Immunity
9
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

28

ADDENDUM

i

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES CITED
Adamson v. Bonesteele,
671 P.2d 693, 295 Or 815, 41 ALR 4 th 1103 (1983)

14

Alexander v. Holden,
66 F.3d 62, 67 (4th Cir. 1995)

24

Biggans v. Foglietta,
403 Pa. 510, 170 ALR 2d 345 (1961)

11

Bogan v. Scott Harris,
523 U.S. 44 (1998)

26

Chateaubriand v. Gaspard,
97 F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 1996)

17

Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,
421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975)
Forrester v. White,
494 U.S. 219 (1988)

3, 9, 13

3, 17

Hahn v. City of Kenner,
984 F.Supp. 436 (E.D. La. 1997)

16

Johnson v. Northside Res. Redev. Council,
467 N.W.2d 826, 828 (Ct. App. MN, 1991)

10

Kamplain v. Curry County Bd. Of Commissioners,
159 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 1998)

25

Krause v. Bower,
2001 UT 28, TJ12,20 P.3d 895 (2001)

ii

2

Liquor Control Commission v. Athas,
243 P.2d 441 (Utah 1952)

2

Long v. Ansell,
293 U.S. 76, 79 L.Ed 208, 55 S.Ct. 21 (1934)

9

McGovern v. Mantz,
182 F.Supp. 343 (D.C. Dist. Col. 1960)

11

Mehau v. Gannett Pacific Corp,
66 Hawaii 133, 658 P.2d 312 (1983), 38 ALR 4 t h 1088,
later proceeding, 690 P.2d 1304

11

Meyer v. McKeown,
266 111. App. 3d 324,204 111. Dec. 593, 596, 641 NE 2d 1212, 1215,
app. denied 158 111. 2d 571, 206 111. Dec. 838, 645 N.E. 2d 1360 . . . . 15
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991)

2

Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Community,
624 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981)
Riddle v. Perry,
40 P.3d 1128 (Utah 2002)

21

1, 2, 9, 15

Roberson v. Mullins,
29 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1994)

26

Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc.,
842 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1992)

2

Sanchez v. Coxon,
175 Ariz. 93, 854 P.2d 126, 126, 128-130
Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 372-375, 71 S.Ct. 783, 45 L.Ed. 1019 (1951)

iii

15

9

West v. Thomson Newspapers,
872 P.2d 999, 1003-4 (Utah 1994)

7

Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hospital,
956 F.2d 1056, 1063 (11 th Cir. 1992)

17

STATUTES, RULES & REGULATIONS
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j),
Utah Code Annotated 1953

1

Senate Bill 1, (S.B.I), The Appropriations Act

6

State Administrative Code Rule R392-302

4

Utah Protection of Public Employees Act, § 67-21-1, et. seq

3, 14, 24, 27

OTHER SOURCES
14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

3

Article I, Section 8, Utah Constitution

21

Article V, Section 1, Utah Constitution

2,22,23

Article VI, Section 7, Utah Constitution

23

Article VI, Section 8, Utah Constitution

2, 8, 9

Article XVI, Sections 3 and 7, Utah Constitution
There are no prior or related appeals in this case.

iv

2, 23

Ronald Rex Ivie, by and through his counsel of record, David J.
Holdsworth, and pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24, submits the following Opening Brief
in this appeal.
BRIEF STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court err when it decided that Sen.

Hickman and Rep. Urquhart (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
Legislative Defendants") were absolutely immune from suit for the claims Mr.
Ivie was asserting and when it dismissed Mr. Ivie's Verified Complaint as
against the Legislative Defendants on the merits and with prejudice?
(A)

Applicable Standard of Appellate Review (with

supporting authority): De novo. In reviewing a trial court's decision to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the appellate court accepts the factual
allegations in the Complaint as true, reviews the facts and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and gives the trial court's decision as to matters of law
no deference, reviewing for correctness. Riddle v. Perry, 40 P.3d 1128
1

(Utah 2002), Krause v. Bower. 2001 UT 28, Tfl2, 20 P.3d 895 (2001),
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). A
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted only if it
appears to a certainty that plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief
under any state of facts which could be proven in support of the claim.
Liquor Control Commission v. Athas, 243 P.2d 441 (Utah 1952). The
existence of a privilege is a question of law for the court. Russell v.
Thomson Newspapers. Inc.. 842 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1992).
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Plaintiffs
filing of his memorandum in opposition to the Legislative Defendants5
motion to dismiss. Record at 89-102 (hereinafter referred to as "R at
ff

PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1 of the
Utah Constitution and Article XVI, Sections 3 and 7 of the Utah Constitution. Some of
the cases which may be determinative include: Riddle v. Perry. 40 P.3d 1128 (Utah
2002) and federal cases interpreting speech or debate clause immunity in the U.S.

2

Constitution such as Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502
(1975), and Forrester v. White. 494 U.S. 219 (1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE. This appeal is from a final order of

the Third District Court.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW . Mr. Ivie filed the

instant action against various Defendants in Third District Court, alleging a violation
of the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act, § 67-21-1, et. seq., Utah Code
Annotated, a violation of the 14 th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a violation of
the State Constitution and a violation of Utah Department of Human Resources
Management ("DHRM") rules and procedures. R. at 1-15. In the course of the
litigation, Mr. Ivie settled his claims as against all Defendants except Sen. Hickman
and Rep. Urquhart. R. at 131-132. The Legislative Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that Mr. Ivie's claims against the Legislative Defendants in the instant
case were barred by principles of legislative immunity and on other principles. R. at
83-85 and R. at 48-82. In October 2003, the Third District Court granted the
Legislative Defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed such claims against such
Legislative Defendants with prejudice. R. at 114-120 and 121-122. Shortly thereafter,
Mr. Ivie's settlement with the other Defendants was finalized and in December 2003,

3

the Court dismissed Mr. Ivie's claims against all other Defendants, thus, creating a
final order. R. 131-137. This appeal followed. R. 141-143.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES

PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
The Utah Department of Health employed Mr. Ivie as a general sanitation
and safety manager for thirteen years. Sen. Hickman and Rep. Urquhart are duly
elected legislators of the Utah Legislature. R. 2, 3, 49.
In May/June 2001, Mr. Ivie's supervisor, Richard Clark ("Clark"),
assigned Mr. Ivie a project to conduct training exercises with the staff of the local
health departments in Cedar City and St. George, Utah, on State rules regarding public
pool sanitation and safety and to assess the compliance of the public pools in that
geographic region with State sanitation and safety standards. R. at 3.
On June 7, 2001, Mr. Ivie submitted a written memorandum to Clark
summarizing his performance of the assignment. He further provided his assessment
that the health departments in Cedar City and St. George, Utah were not enforcing
State Administrative Code Rule R392-302 "Design, Construction and Operation of
Public Pools" and were, therefore, allowing members of the public swimming in public
pools to be exposed to potentially serious or life threatening health hazards. R. at 3, 4,
49.

4

Subsequently, a constituent of Sen. Hickman and Rep. Urquhart
complained to such legislators that her swimming pool should not be required to
comply with the requirements of the State rules regulating public swimming pools.
Thereafter, Hickman and Urquhart contacted Mr. Ivie's supervisor. Subsequently,
Hickman and Urquhart contacted Mr. Ivie. R. 4, 11.
Mr. Ivie spoke with Legislators Hickman and Urquhart about the
requirements of the State rules and why they were necessary. R. at 4. Hickman and
Urquhart insisted that Mr. Ivie exempt pools operated by retirement communities in the
St. George area, from portions of the State rules. R. at 4. Mr. Ivie informed them that
there was no permissive language in the Rule to allow him to do that and that he
needed to enforce the law as it had been written. R. at 4. Both Hickman and Urquhart
told Mr. Ivie that if he did not comply with their wishes, they would deal with the issue
in their own way. R. at 4. Mr. Ivie assumed that what they meant was introducing
legislation to allow the Department to grant exemptions, where appropriate to the State
rules. However, what Hickman and Urquhart meant, unbeknownst to Mr. Ivie, was not
to introduce legislation, but rather to eliminate funding for Mr. Ivie's job and to cost
him his employment with the State.
Subsequently, the Joint Executive Appropriations Committee of the Utah
Legislature, of which Hickman was a Vice-Chairman, held a committee meeting. Rep.

5

Urquhart was not present. At that meeting, it was moved to reduce the Department of
Health's budget by $115,700. The Committee voted and passed the motion, with all
but one of the eighteen members present voting in favor of the motion. R. at 50-51.
The reduction in funding to the Department of Health, recommended by
the Executive Appropriations Committee, was sponsored by Senator Leonard
Blackham as Senate Bill 1, (S.B.I), The Appropriations Act. On March 5, 2002, both
houses of the Utah State Legislature S.B.I passed. On March 26, 2002, Governor
Michael O. Leavitt signed S.B.I into law. R. at 51.
The reduction in funds required the Department of Health to eliminate
two full time positions. The budget bill did not specify which jobs needed to be
eliminated. R. at 5, 51.
Sometime thereafter, Sen. Hickman made a threat to the Department of
Health that if Executive Director, Rod Betit, did not implement the budget cuts in such
a way that the cuts eliminated Mr. Ivie's position (and Mr. Ivie), Sen. Hickman would
push for future cuts in appropriations to the Department of Health. R. at 5.
Accordingly, the Executive Director of the Department of Health, Rod Betit, singled
out Mr. Ivie for termination and on June 25, 2002, the Department of Health notified
Mr. Ivie that due to the non-appropriation of funds from the Utah State Legislature, the

6

Department was terminating his position and terminating his employment. The
Department did not offer him any retreat rights. R. at 5-6.
On July 24, 2002, Mr. Ivie submitted an appeal to the Department
challenging his termination on several grounds, including the fact that he was the
senior staff member and there were junior staff members that could be terminated
instead. R. at 6.
On July 25, 2002, Executive Director Betit prepared and signed a
workforce adjustment plan which had the purpose and effect of terminating Mr. Ivie's
employment. R. at 6.
On October 22, 2002, Mr. Ivie hand delivered a Notice of Claim to the
Utah Attorney General's office. R. at 8, 13-15. The Utah Attorney General's office
did not respond within ninety days, therefore, the claim was deemed denied. R. at 9.
The instant case followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss, the Court
must take the allegations of Mr. Ivie's Verified Complaint as true. See West v.
Thomson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999,1003-4 (Utah 1994). Taking the facts set forth
in Mr. Ivie's Verified Complaint as true, the trial court should have concluded that Mr.
Ivie's allegations as to the actions of the Legislative Defendants placed such actions
7

outside the scope of legislative immunity, and, thus, that Mr. Ivie had stated a
cognizable and justiciable claim against the Legislative Defendants. The trial court
erred when it granted the Legislative Defendants5 motion to dismiss with prejudice.
The trial court should have denied the motion and allowed the case to proceed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS WERE CAPABLE
OF A READING WHICH PLACES CERTAIN ACTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE
DEFENDANTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE
IMMUNITY /LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY.
In their motion to dismiss, the Legislative Defendants had argued they
were immune from suit because of the "Speech or Debate" clause of Article VI,
Section 8, of the State Constitution, which provides immunity for a legislator's actions
within the legislative arena.1 (The Legislative Defendants had also argued that all of
the acts alleged and at issue were acts within the legislative sphere and, thus, fell
within the scope of speech or debate clause immunity). R. at 52-57.
The District Court determined that the dispositive issue was whether the
Legislative Defendants were immune from the claims underlying Plaintiffs lawsuit.

lr

rhe Legislative Defendants had also argued that the Complaint raised an issue which was
non-justiciable and that Legislative Defendants were immune from liability under common law
principles of legislative immunity. R. at 57-62. The parties had fully briefed such issues but because
the trial court found the issue of legislative immunity dispositive, R. at 117, 118, the Court did not
address the Legislative Defendants' remaining arguments.

8

The District Court found and concluded that the Legislative Defendants' actions were
within the legislative sphere and, thus, immune from suit and granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss. R. at 118. For the reasons set forth below, such a decision was
erroneous.
A.

Speech or Debate Clause Immunity.

Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution provides immunity
to legislators "for words used in any speech or debate in either house." This
language is modeled after similar language in the U.S. Constitution. The
judicial branch has historically interpreted the speech and debate clause broadly,
applying it not just to statements on the floors of the legislative houses but
statements within committee meetings and other legislative proceedings. See,
for example, Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501
(1975), Tennevv. Brandhove. 341 U.S. 367, 372-375, 71 S.Ct. 783, 45 L.Ed.
1019 (1951), Riddle v. Perry, 40 P.3d 1128, 1131-1132 (Utah 2002). Yet, the
U.S. Supreme Court has also stated that similar language in the federal
constitution is exact and, thus, there is no room for a construction which would
extend the privilege beyond its reasonable terms. See Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S.
76, 79 L.Ed 208, 55 S.Ct. 21 (1934) (privilege or immunity of a member of
Congress from arrest limited to physical restraint or detention of a person, not

9

immunity from being served with a summons or a subpoena or from having
property attached as a means of satisfying a judgment; and publication and
circulation of allegedly libelous documents by a U.S. Senator outside of the
Senate could subject the Senator to liability for libel). Thus, the speech and
debate clause may create an absolute privilege to speak and participate in
legislative proceedings without liability for defamation (or other torts) but does
not create absolute immunity for all acts of legislators. See Johnson v. Northside
Res. Redev. Council. 467 N.W.2d 826, 828 (Ct. App. MN, 1991) (councilman's
claim of official immunity was an immunity defense similar to qualified
privilege applicable to claims of defamation committed by a public official.
Such claims of limited immunity did not extend if improper motives were
shown).
Because the speech or debate clauses of the U.S. and Utah
Constitutions deal most obviously with speech or debate, most of the cases
involving the delimitation of the scope of the immunity granted by speech or
debate clauses have arisen in the context of claims for slander or libel against
Members of Congress and legislators of the states. Although Mr. Ivie is not
alleging the tort of defamation, but a claim under the state government
whistleblower protection act, it is useful to examine how courts faced with

10

claims of libel against legislators have analyzed the scope of the immunity based
on the speech or debate clause. The cases involving claims of defamation
against Congressmen are fairly rare. See McGovern v. Mantz, 182 F.Supp. 343
(D.C. Dist. Col. 1960) (a Congressman's privilege and immunity under the
speech or debate clause of the U.S. Constitution did not extend to republication
of allegedly libelous remarks which the Congressman published in a letter he
circulated off the floor of the House; the Congressman could have been liable
for malicious defamation for his unofficial republication and dissemination of
allegedly libelous remarks).
The cases involving claims of defamation against state legislators
seem to be more numerous. Out of such cases has come the following
test-whether allegedly defamatory actions made by a state legislator are outside
of speech or debate immunity depends on whether they were made "in the
exercise of a legislative function." See Mehau v. Gannett Pacific Corp , 66
Hawaii 133, 658 P.2d 312 (1983), 38 ALR4 t h 1088, later proceeding, 690 P.2d
1304 (where it was not shown as a matter of law that the legislator was
performing a legislative function at the time of the remarks alleged to be
defamatory but a performing a political chore, summary judgment to the
legislator was inappropriate). See also Biggans v. Foglietta, 403 Pa. 510, 170

11

ALR 2d 345 (1961) (where city councilman's letter to the city manager which
allegedly libeled the plaintiff was published not on the floor of the city council
but through a political headquarters, such publication not absolutely privileged,
summary judgment to the legislator was reversed and remanded).
Applying this case law which has developed in the libel context as
to the scope of immunity granted by the speech or debate clause to the instant
case, the issue is whether the actions Mr. Ivie complained of were within the
"legitimate legislative sphere." The trial court framed the issue correctly; it just
answered the question erroneously. Where the trial court erred was in finding
that the actions of which Mr. Ivie complained were within the "legitimate
legislative sphere."2 This was erroneous.
1.

Not all of the Legislative Defendants' actions of

which Mr. Ivie complains were made in speeches or debates or other
actions during legislative sessions or proceedings.
The courts may interpret the speech or debate clause
broadly but they do still apply it to actions bearing some relationship to

2

The trial court found that Plaintiff had not pled sufficient facts to show that Plaintiff had a
claim against the Legislative Defendants. But the trial court's core finding was that "the acts
underlying Plaintiffs claims were within the Legislative Defendants['] power as legislators." For the
reasons set forth below, this interpretation of the scope of speech or debate clause immunity is too
expansive of an interpretation of speech or debate clause immunity.

12

speech or debate. See, generally, Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund. 421 U.S. 491 at 503 (1975). Mr. Ivie was not suing Sen. Hickman
or Rep. Urquhart for anything they said during any speech or debate in
either House of the State Legislature or for any actions they orchestrated
during the budget deliberations occurring during the legislative session at
issue. He is suing them for actions they took before the legislative
session: for trying to interfere in his performance of his job, for
threatening to take adverse action against him if he did not comply with
their directives, and for the actions they apparently took after the
legislative session was over to make sure the cuts in funding were
implemented in such a way that they cost him his job.
Mr. Ivie concedes that during the legislative session any
actions the Legislative Defendants took to reallocate priorities and to
appropriate public funds accordingly are absolutely immune. But before
the session was underway, when they interfered in the performance of his
job, and after the session was over, when they retaliated against him by
threatening to push for further cuts in appropriations to the Department
of Health if the Executive Director of the Department of Health did not
specifically implement the budget cuts in such a way as to ensure Mr.

13

Ivie's termination, they stepped outside of the scope of legitimate
legislative action and immunity. They were on their own. Compare
Adamson v. Bonesteele. 671 P.2d 693, 295 Or 815, 41 ALR 4 th 1103
(1983) (no statutory law or common law justified extending immunity to
shield a local legislator's remarks concerning legislative business made
outside the legislative meeting place and outside the legislative process
itself). Mr. Ivie had argued that such acts were outside the scope of
legitimate legislative activity and, thus, outside the shield of the speech
or debate clause. The trial court's conclusion to the contrary was error.
The actions of which Mr. Ivie complains all fell outside of
the scope of the immunity granted by "speech and debate" clause. The
issue was not the Legislative Defendants' motives; it was whether the
Legislative Defendants' actions had something to do with speech or
debate in a legislative proceeding. The actions at issue occurred outside
of the legislative session and outside the legislative process; they were
individual acts which Mr. Ivie alleged violated the Utah Protection of
Public Employees Act, not within the scope of legitimate legislative
action. Thus, Mr. Ivie's argument that the trial court's expansive
interpretation of speech or debate clause immunity was erroneous.

14

Compare again the cases involving claims of defamation against
government officials. Meyer v. McKeown, 266 111. App. 3d 324, 204 111.
Dec. 593, 596, 641 NE 2d 1212, 1215, app. denied 158 111. 2d 571, 206
111. Dec. 838, 645 N.E. 2d 1360 (where member of village board of
trustees sent letter allegedly defaming real estate developer to 1200
constituents, court erred in dismissing action on basis of privilege where
legislator's statements were not within scope of member's legislative
duties). In doing what they did, the Legislative Defendants were not
engaged in any work on behalf of the Legislature or a legislative
committee. They were on their own errand and, therefore, outside the
scope of legislative immunity. Compare Riddle v. Perry, 40 P.3d 1128
(Utah 2002) at 1134 (for legislative immunity to apply to witnesses in a
legislative proceeding, the statement must have some relationship to the
proceeding). And see Sanchez v. Coxon, 175 Ariz. 93, 854 P.2d 126,
126, 128-130 (even though no legislation was proposed, pending or
contemplated when councilman's statements made, councilman speaking
to a legislative body was engaged in legislative function of speaking to a
legislative body-the specific content of his statement did not make his

15

speech an executive function), Accord Hahn v. City of Kenner, 984
F.Supp. 436 (E.D. La. 1997).3
"Legislative activity11 is not all encompassing. If legislators
venture outside of the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, they can
lose immunity. That is what happened here. Reading the Verified
Complaint as the trial court should have read it in considering the motion
to dismiss, the trial court should have concluded that Mr. Ivie's
allegations were sufficient to place certain actions of the Legislative
Defendants outside of legitimate legislative activity and the legislative
sphere so as to withstand a motion to dismiss on grounds of speech or
debate clause immunity.
2.

The Legislative Defendants' actions fell outside of

making policy for the entire state.
As set forth above, state legislative officials may be
absolutely immune from liability for official conduct within the sphere of
legitimate legislative activity or authority.
3

See also Restatement of Torts 2d, § 590, a member of a state legislative body is absolutely
privileged to make defamatory statements concerning another while in the performance of the
legislative function, that privilege is not limited to conduct on the floor of the legislative body but
extends to the work of legislative committees or subcommittees that are engaged in any investigation
or other work authorized by the legislative body, whether that work is performed while that body is in
session or during a recess.

16

Another test of whether any given act of a legislator is
inside or outside of the legitimate legislative sphere seems to be not only
whether the act occurred while the Legislature was in session or during a
meeting of a legislative committee; but whether the legislator's actions at
issue were intended to impact only one or two or a few select individuals
or the general public at large. The latter may be legislative activity, the
former may not be. See Chateaubriand v. Gaspard, 97 F.3d 1218, 1221
(9th Cir. 1996) (state legislators who demoted and then fired a public
employee were not entitled to assert an absolute immunity defense-the
court considered whether the action involved ad hoc decision making
which affected only a few persons, as opposed to formulation of general
policy which affected the public at large) and Yeldell v. Cooper Green
Hospital 956 F.2d 1056, 1063 (11 th Cir. 1992) (decision to introduce
legislation calling for redistribution of work assignments protected by
absolute immunity, but decision to fire, demote or suspend specific
employees were not protected by immunity). This test is functional, it
focuses on the basic nature of the activity performed, not the identity of
the actor who performed it. Compare Forrester v. White m 494 U.S. 219
(1988).
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The trial court found that the acts underlying Mr. Ivie's
claims were within the Legislative Defendants5 power as legislators.
"Any threats made by the Legislative Defendants were more or less true
statements of their power as legislators." But after their threats, these
legislators did not proceed to introduce or pass legislation exempting
pools at retirement communities from the State rules regulating public
swimming pools; they engineered the elimination of the job of the one
executive branch employee responsible for executing the law and
enforcing the regulations and who refused to bow to their political
pressure.
What Mr. Ivie is complaining of is not that Sen. Hickman
and Rep. Urquhart eventually engineered decisions on the state budget
that had the effect of necessitating a reduction in force in the Department
of Health (though not necessarily the selection of Mr. Ivie for the
reduction in force). He is not complaining that the legislators
orchestrated the passage of a budget bill which eliminated some funding
to the Department of Health and, as a result, some positions. He is
alleging that prior to the session, the two legislators, on their own,
purported to tell Mr. Ivie what he should be doing in his job and tried to
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control his actions and then, when he resisted their political pressure, the
two legislators decided to retaliate against him, not by changing the law,
but by cutting funds for the program Mr. Ivie administered and the job he
held. Mr. Ivie is also alleging that, in addition, after the legislative
session, the two legislators continued to retaliate against Mr. Ivie by
telling those in the executive branch in a position to implement the
budget cuts, that they had to implement the budget cuts in such a way as
to make sure that Mr. Ivie would lose his job.
The Legislative Defendants' discretionary decisions
making policy for the whole state, such as setting the budgetary priorities
for the state, is a core legislative function. Mr. Ivie realizes those actions
are shielded. But those are not the actions of which Mr. Ivie complains.
Legitimate legislative action would have been the making
of policy for the entire state, such as sponsoring legislation exempting
swimming pools operated by retirement communities from state rules on
public swimming pools. But dictating to an executive branch employee
that he should not enforce State rules against the owner of one public
pool and threatening such employee that if he continued to enforce the
rules as he understood them to be, he would be neutralized, crossed the
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line from making policy for the entire State to making ad hoc decisions
benefitting only a few. And then, by arranging the firing of an employee
who was simply doing his job and enforcing rules the two legislators did
not want enforced, Sen. Hickman and Rep. Urquhart did not seek to
benefit the public at large or even their constituents-they engaged in a
deliberate effort to subvert enforcement of the law by eliminating the
employee in the executive branch who was just doing his job. That is
outside the scope of legitimate legislative activity. Legislators certainly
have the duty to propose budget decisions. And if that was all the
Legislative Defendants did in this case, it would have been proper for the
trial court to grant the motion to dismiss. But Mr. Ivie alleged the
Legislative Defendants did more than just reallocate funding priorities.
He alleged when he disagreed with the Legislative Defendants' attempts
to influence his performance of his executive branch functions, they
retaliated against him and targeted this one employee for termination. In
doing so, Sen. Hickman and Rep. Urquhart did not seek to benefit the
public at large, they engaged in a deliberate effort to harm one employee.
That is not making policy for the entire state, thus, their actions were
outside the scope of legitimate legislative activity.
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Mr. Ivie is not challenging the right of legislators to impose
taxes and appropriate taxpayers' funds. Mr. Ivie is not asking the Court
to reverse the reduction of funding to the Department of Health. That is
something the Court should not do and cannot do. That appropriation
decision is within the legitimate legislative sphere. What Mr. Ivie is
challenging by naming the Legislative Defendants is the legitimacy of
Sen. Hickman's dictating to one employee of the executive branch as to
how he ought to be doing his job (and what would happen to him if he
did not do as Sen. Hickman and Rep. Urquhart demanded) and after the
Legislature passed the budget and the Executive Branch needed to figure
out how to implement those budget cuts, Sen. Hickman's threats to the
Department of Health that if the Executive Director did not implement
the budget cuts in such a way as to guarantee that Mr. Ivie lost his job,
Sen. Hickman would push for further cuts in appropriations to the
Department of Health. Those actions are not actions making policy for
the State of Utah but decisions targeted at one person (similar, in effect,
to bills of attainder, prohibited in the Utah Constitution, Article I, §18,
and see Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Community, 624 P.2d 1138
(Utah 1981) (a bill of attainder is one that imposes punishment upon an
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identifiable person without judicial process)). The Legislative
Defendants' actions fell outside of policy making and, thus, outside of
the legislative sphere.
Reading the Verified Complaint as the trial court should
have read it in considering the motion to dismiss, the trial court should
have concluded that Mr. Ivie's allegations placed the Legislative
Defendants' actions outside the sphere of policy making for the entire
state and beyond the scope of legitimate legislative activity.
3.

The Legislative Defendants' actions at issue were

executive, not legislative and, thus, not entitled to legislative immunity.
A third test of whether any given act of a legislator
constitutes legitimate legislative activity seems to be whether the
legislator was making laws as a legislator is charged to do or strayed over
into enforcement of the laws, the province of the executive branch. The
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article V, Distribution of Power,
states:
Section 1. [Three departments of
government.] The powers of the government of the
State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of these
22

departments, shall exercise any functions
appertaining to either of the others, except in the
cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
Nothing in the Utah Constitution gives members of the legislative branch
the power to execute the laws: to make specific decisions regarding how
one employee of the executive branch ought to do his job.
Mr. Ivie's allegation of the Legislative Defendants'
targeted interference in the executive department placed the actions of
the Legislative Defendants in violation of the Utah Constitution's Article
V, and, thus, also outside the scope of legitimate legislative action.
The State Constitution also guarantees to employees the
right to be free of political control. See Utah Constitution, Article XVI,
Section 3:
The Legislature shall prohibit:
Section 3: the political...control of
employees; and
And see Article VI, Section 7: The
Legislature, by appropriate legislation, shall provide
for the enforcement of the provisions of this article.
Mr. Ivie's allegations as to the Legislative Defendants' actions towards
him read very much like political control of an employee.
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In enacting the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act,
Utah Code, § 67-21-1, et. seq., the Legislature was acting in furtherance
of the State Constitution's command to the Legislature to provide for the
enforcement of laws which prohibit political control of employees. If the
Legislature is immune from the provisions of the Utah Protection of
Public Employees Act, which the Legislature itself passed, such
construction would violate the very spirit and intent of the State
Constitution requirements.
The actions of which Mr. Ivie complains occurred outside
of the legislative session and outside the work of any legislative
committee. They also occurred outside of the function of making policy
for the entire state. What Mr. Ivie is complaining about are actions by
members of the legislative branch seeking to dictate and control (exactly
as management would seek to control) the actions of an employee in the
executive branch and retaliating against an employee in the executive
branch for not following their directives and ultimatums.

Those actions

constitute trying to execute the laws (or, in this case, not execute the
laws). This crosses the line from the legislative function to the executive
function. See also Alexander v. Holden. 66 F.3d 62, 67 (4th Cir. 1995)
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(lawmakers making decision to not rehire or reappoint plaintiff to a
position that had been consolidated into another position not entitled to
absolute immunity). See also Kamplain v. Curry County Bd. Of
Commissioners. 159 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 1998) (local legislative officials
who barred a plaintiff from speaking in future meetings of the board
were carrying out an essentially executive function and, thus, not entitled
to legislative immunity). In trying to control how Mr. Ivie did his job
and then, because he insisted on enforcing the laws as they existed,
retaliating against him in an indirect but very certain way, the Legislative
Defendants sought to exercise executive power. That takes them outside
of legitimate legislative activity.
Once a legislator steps outside of enacting laws of general
application for the state as a whole and into the role of telling one rank
and file employee of one department of the executive branch how to do
his job, not through general legislative oversight of the entire
Department, but through specific one-on-one directives and threats, that
legislator has stepped out of the legitimate legislative sphere into the
executive sphere and shed himself of legislative immunity. Likewise,
after passing a budget for the entire state government, if a legislator
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ventures beyond determining budget priorities and appropriating tax
dollars, and into the role of telling the management of an executive
department to make sure budget cuts are implemented in such a way as to
make sure that one particular employee loses his job, that legislator has
sailed out of the safe harbor of legislative immunity and into the
executive ocean and loses legislative immunity. See Roberson v.
MulHns, 29 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1994) (board's decision to terminate
Plaintiff as superintendent of public works not done in a legislative
capacity and thus no absolute immunity). Contra see Bogan v. Scott
Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998) (city officials who approved a city ordinance
which eliminated a city employee's job entitled to absolute immunity).
Taking the allegations of the Verified Complaint as true, as
the trial court should have done in deciding a motion to dismiss, the trial
court should have concluded that the Legislative Defendants strayed
from legitimate legislative activity into executive action and lost the
ability to cloak themselves with legislative immunity.
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Nothing Mr. Ivie is asking the Court to do challenges legislative
independence. Everything Mr. Ivie is seeking fosters the separation of powers. Mr.
26

Ivie is asking the Court to give meaning to the decision the Legislature itself made
when it enacted a state law providing protection to state government whistleblowers in
the executive branch and to not allow the Legislature or individual legislators to hide
behind the cloak of legislative immunity. To exempt the Legislature from needing to
comply with the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act law and to sanction

a
retaliation by the Legislature against whistleblowers would be very unfortunate
A

development.
Mr. Ivie's allegations that the Legislative Defendants acted outside the
scope of legitimate legislative activity, raised a fact question as to whether the actions
of which Mr. Ivie was complaining fell within or outside of the sphere of legitimate
legislative authority. The trial court should not have granted the motion to dismiss but
should have let the case proceed. The Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court's
dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this/fr? Hay of June, 2004.

iswor
Attorney fokj^inrfff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
lis fkftey
I hereby certify that on this
/fc^cfay cof June, 2004, a true, correct and
complete copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF was delivered
upon the attorney(s) indicated below by the following method(s):
Facsimile
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
E-Mail
M. Gay Taylor, Esq.
Robert H. Rees, Esq.
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel
436 State Capitol
Salt Lake City UT 84114-1202
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ADDENDUM
Trial Court's Minute Entry
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY DEPARTMENT
MINUTE ENTRY

RONALD REX IVIE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 030400804

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, SEN. JOHN WILLIAM HICKMAN
REP. STEPHEN H. URQUHART,
Defendants.

Judge MICHAEL K. BURTON

Tjl
Before the Court is Senator John W. Hickman (Hickman) and Representative Stephen H.
Urquhart's (Hickman and Urquhart or jointly as "Legislative Defendants") motion to dismiss
joined by the State of Utah (Utah) and the Utah Department of Health (Department of Health or
jointly as "Utah Defendants"). The Court GRANTS the Legislative Defendants' motion to
dismiss.
BACKGROUND
%2 Hickman and Urquhart are duly elected legislators of Utah. Ronald Rex Ivie (Plaintiff)
was employed by the Department of Health as a general sanitation and safety manager for thirteen
years.
P
In May/June 2001, Plaintiff was assigned by his supervisor, Richard Clark (Clark), to
conduct training exercises with the staff of the local health department and assess public pool
sanitation and safety program in St. George and Cedar City, Utah.
1f4
On June 7, 2001, Plaintiff submitted a written memorandum to Clark summarizing his
training. He further provided his assessment that the health department in St. George and Cedar
City, Utah were not enforcing State Administrative Code Rule R392-302 "Design, Construction
and Operation of Public Pools" and was, therefore, allowing members of the public swimming
pool to be exposed to potentially serious or life threatening health hazards. (Plaintiffs memo).
P
Subsequently, a constituent of Hickman and Urquhart complained to them that her pool
should not be required to comply with the requirements of the State rules regulating public
swimming pools. Thereafter, Hickman and Urquhart contacted Plaintiffs supervisors.
1}6
Plaintiff spoke with Hickman and Urquhart about the requirements of the State rules and
why they were necessary. Hickman and Urquhart insisted that Plaintiff exempt pools operated by

retirement communities in St. George and Cedar City, Utah from portions of the State rules.
Plaintiff informed them that there was no permissive language in the Rule to allow him to do that.
Both Hickman and Urquhart told Plaintiff that if he did not comply with their wishes, they would
deal with it in their own way with legislative action.
fJ
Subsequently, the Joint Executive Appropriations Committee of the Utah Legislature
of which Hickman was a Vice-Chairman held a meeting. Urquhart was not present. At that
meeting, Senator Poulton moved to reduce the Department of Health's budget by $115,700 to
make that amount available for Medicaid breast and cervical cancer treatment. The committee
voted and passed the motion, with all but one of the eighteen members present voting in favor of
the motion. The reduction reflected the elimination of two full-time positions of the Department
ofHealth.
%% The reduction in funding to the Department ofHealth, recommended by the Executive
Appropriations Committee, was sponsored by Senator Leonard Blackham as Senate Bill 1,
Appropriations Act (S.B. 1). On March 5, 2002, S.B. 1 passed both houses of the Utah State
Legislature. On March 26, 2002, Governor Michael O. Leavitt signed S.B1 into law 1
Tf9
Executive Director of the Department ofHealth, Rod Betit, (Betit) singled out Plaintiff for
termination because of Hickman's real or veiled threat to push for future cuts to appropriations of
the Department ofHealth if Betit did not terminate Plaintiffs position.
1J10 On June 25, 2002, the Department ofHealth notified Plaintiff that due to the nonappropriation of funds from the Utah State Legislature his position was being terminated.
Ifl 1 On July 24, 2002, Plaintiff submitted an appeal to the Department challenging his
termination on several grounds, including the fact that he was the senior staff member and there
were junior staff members that could be terminated instead.
1J12 On July 25, 2002, Betit prepared and signed a workforce adjustment plan that had the
purpose and effect of terminating Plaintiffs employment.
If 13
On October 22, 2002, Plaintiff hand delivered a Notice of Claim to Becky Jorgenson, a
receptionist of the Utah Attorney General's office. The Utah Attorney General's Office did not
respond within ninety days, therefore, the claim is deemed denied.

1

The Court notes that these facts were not in Plaintiffs verified complaint, however,
Defendants provided these facts in their brief in support of the motion to dismiss requesting the
Court take judicial notice of such facts. Plaintiff did not oppose. Accordingly, the Court takes
judicial notice of the procedural history relating to the passing of S.B.I, which is the bill that
reduced the Department ofHealth funding by $115,700.
-2-

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
fl4
On January 21, 2003, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint alleging wrongful termination in
violation of the United States Constitution, Utah Constitution, Utah Protection of Public
Employees Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 etseq. (UPPEA), Department of Human Resource
Managment Rules (DHRM) and public policy, against Defendants seeking damages that include
lost wages, benefits, compensatory damages, punitive damages, court costs and attorney's fees.
T|15

On April 24, 2003, Utah and the Department of Health filed their answer.

%16

On June 30, 2003, Hickman and Urquhart filed their motion to dismiss.

TJ17 On July 28, 2003, Plaintiff filed his opposition to Hickman and Urquhart's motion to
dismiss.
If 18 On August 28, 2003, Utah and the Department of Health filed their joinder in argument to
Hickman and Urquhart's motion to dismiss. Utah and the Department of Health agreed that
Hickman and Urquhart are immune from liability due to the Speech or Debate Clause of Article
VI, section 8 of the Utah Constitution and furthermore, that they are not "employers" as defined
by Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-2.
If 19 On September 2, 2003, Hickman and Urquhart filed their reply to the Plaintiffs
opposition. That same day, Hickman and Urquhart filed a notice to submit.
LAW
Tf20 Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a party may move to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under subdivision (b)(6) admits the
facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts. St.
Benedict's Development Co., v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). A complaint
does not fail to state a claim unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to
no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. Liquor Control
Commission v. Athas, 243 P.2d 441 (Utah 1952).
\2\
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his
favor. Mounteerv. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991).
ANALYSIS
1(22 Legislative Defendants claim that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Specifically, the Legislative Defendants claim that they are (1) immune from liability for
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action taken as legislators, (2) not an "employer" as defined by § 67-21-2 and (3) not the cause of
Plaintiffs injury.
TJ23
The dispositive issue is whether the Legislative Defendants are immune from the
underlying law suit of Plaintiff. In support of the Legislative Defendants' immunity claim, they
argue that they are immune because (A) the Speech or Debate Clause of Article VI, Section 8,
provides immunity from acts within the legislative sphere, (B) the issue is nonjusticiable and (C)
common-law legislative immunity applies.
TJ24
Article VI, Section of the Utah Constitution provides immunity "for words used in any
speech or debate in either house, [members of the Legislature] shall not be questioned in any
other place." See, e.g., Riddle v. Perry, 40 P.3d 1128 (Utah 2002).
TJ25
The Speech and Debate clause protection is there "to support the rights of the people, by
enabling their representative to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions,
civil or criminal" Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951).
TJ26
The Speech and Debate clause is read broadly. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975). "Rather than giving the clause a cramped construction, the
Court has sought to implement its fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from executive
and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to control his conduct as a legislator." Gravel v.
United State, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972).
1J27
The inquiry is whether the activities plaintiff complains of are within the "legitimate
legislative sphere." Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, supra, 421 U S at 503
Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on
the motive or intent of the official performing it. The privilege of absolute
immunity would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives. . .
. [it is] not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into
the motives of legislators. . . . This leaves us with the question of whether,
stripped of all considerations of intent and motive, petitioners' actions were
legislative.
Bogan v. Scott Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54-55 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S. at 373-74.
P8
The Legislative Defendants argue that the acts Plaintiff complains of were within the
legitimate legislative sphere, therefore, they are absolutely immune for those acts. Specifically,
the Legislative Defendants argue that the actions of the Legislative Defendants were part of the
process the Legislature goes through each year to appropriate public funds Moreover, the
Legislative Defendants did not reallocate or determine the appropriation of public funds by

-4-

themselves, it was decided by the Executive Appropriations Committee, a majority of both the
House and the Senate and final signing by the Governor.
1J29 In opposition, the Plaintiff argues that the acts Plaintiff complains of were not taken in the
Legislative Defendants1 capacity as legislators, but rather before and after the legislative sessions.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that he complains of the Legislative Defendants acts to interfere with
his job performance by telling him what to do, for threatening to take adverse action against him if
he did not comply with their directives, for threatening to push for further cuts in appropriations
to the Department of Health if Betit did not implement the budget cuts in a way to terminate
Plaintiffs job. Plaintiff argues that these acts were outside the scope of "legitimate legislative
sphere" and absolute immunity does not apply.
pO
Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, as this Court must do on a
motion to dismiss, the Court concludes that there are insufficient facts to show that Plaintiff has a
claim against the Legislative Defendants. The acts underlying Plaintiffs claims were within the
Legislative Defendants power as legislators. Plaintiff specifically named the Legislative
Defendants in their capacities as senator and representative. Plaintiff has failed to provide any
cases wherein a private party had a cause of action against a legislator for passing a bill that
eliminates a position or threatens to use his legislative power if a plaintiff failed to do what the
legislator requests. Legislative Defendants have authority to propose budget decisions. That is
what the Legislative Defendants did here. S.B, 1 reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision
implicating the budgetary priorities of the state of Utah. The bill involved an amount to be
transferred from one department to another for policy reasons. Motives of legislators cannot be
considered and, therefore, the Court cannot infer wrongful intent on the Legislative Defendants in
their proposal Broadly applying legislative acts as being protected, the Court concludes that the
Legislative Defendants' acts were within the legitimate legislative sphere.2 The Court concludes
that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the Legislative
Defendants are absolutely immune from the acts alleged by Plaintiff
$31
The issue of immunity being dispositive, the Court need not address the remaining claims
of the Legislative Defendants.

2

Moreover, the Court notes that even if the Legislative Defendants' threats were outside
of the broad umbrella of protection, any threats made by the Legislative Defendants were more or
less true statements of their power as legislators. Plaintiff has failed to provide a legal basis for
how these threats are actionable. The only plausible cause of action that this Court can conceive
is a § 1983 claim. However, even there, the Legislative Defendants are protected. Bogan v. Scott
Harris, supra, 523 U.S. 44.
-5-

ft?2

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Legislative Defendants1 motion to dismiss.

So ordered this #^

day of September 2003.
MICHAEL K. BURTON^
Third District Court Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RONALD REX IVJJE,
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ORDER GRANTING LEGISLATIVE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH
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STEPHEN H. URQUHART,
Defendants.

Case No. 030400804
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On June 30,2003, defendants Senator John W. Hickman and Representative Stephen H.
Urquhart ("legislative defendants") filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs verified complaint. On
September 23,2003, the court, having considered the legislative defendants' motion and the arguments
of counsel for all parties, issued a minute entry dated September 23, 2003. Pursuant to the court's ruling
in the minute entry that the legislative defendants are absolutely immune from suit for the claims

•issertH by plaintiff, the court heieby aiders that plaintiffs verified complaint against the legist Hi w
defendants be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice and un the merits.
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